Episode
Where the Lion Can’t Reach: Unconventional Warfare in Major War
- Podcast
- Irregular Warfare Podcast
- Published
- Apr 24, 2026
- Duration seconds
- 3105
- Processing state
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Summary
Description Episode 153 examines the role of unconventional warfare and special operations forces in conventional major war. Summary This conversation explores how unconventional warfare can support, shape, and sometimes substitute for conventional military operations in large-scale combat. Our guests examine what unconventional warfare is, why it matters beyond the special operations community, and how support to resistance forces can create strategic and operational effects for joint force commanders. The discussion draws heavily on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where U.S. Special Forces partnered with Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create a northern front, tie down Iraqi forces, generate intelligence, and support the broader conventional campaign. The episode also examines the limits and risks of unconventional warfare, including partner alignment, feasibility assessments, political constraints, and the need for policymakers and commanders to understand both the value and the limitations of this tool. Takeaways Unconventional warfare is best understood in simple terms as support to resistance movements or insurgencies. Unconventional warfare is not just a SOF issue; conventional joint force commanders and civilian policymakers need to understand how it can support broader campaigns. UW can supplement conventional forces by shaping the battlefield, imposing costs, generating intelligence, and creating dilemmas for the enemy. UW can also substitute for conventional forces when geography, politics, or access prevent a conventional formation from operating in a particular area. The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides a powerful example of UW supporting a conventional campaign, as a small number of U.S. SOF personnel helped mobilize Kurdish Peshmerga forces to create pressure in th…